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Abstract
Many states restrict the access of minors to abortion services and implement restrictions that 
make abortions more difficult for women to obtain. The purpose of this paper is to show that 
these state restrictions do have some effect on overall state and teen abortion rates. Through 
regression analysis this paper estimates the impacts of these enforced abortion restrictions on 
abortion rates between 1973 and 2008. Using four estimation methods that account for difficult- 
to-measure variables the results suggest that parental involvement laws can decrease minors’ 
demand for abortion by about seven percent. The incidence of other state restrictions, such as 
mandatory delay after counseling, can decrease overall state abortion rates by four percent.
Introduction
Over the past 20 years there has been an increasing trend towards state policies that limit the ease 
and accessibility of abortions. Even though there has been no overruling of the Supreme Court 
ruling Roe v. Wade (1973), abortion opponents have been able to see decreases in overall 
abortion rates. In 1990 and 2005 the total number of abortions fell from 1,054,719 to 820,151, a 
decline of 22.2% (CDC). There are numerous different economic factors that may contribute to 
this decline. Each state has varying anti-abortion legislation. Some states have lenient laws 
towards abortion, whereas some states have more strict enforceable laws. The purpose of this 
paper is to see what effect certain state abortion restrictions have on abortion rates. The three 
restrictions that I included in my model are parental involvement, mandatory waiting period, and 
public funding. There are currently 37 states that require some sort of parental involvement in a 
minor’s decision to have an abortion. 22 of those states require one or both parents to consent to 
the procedure, while 11 require that one or both parents be notified and 4 states require both 
parental consent and notification. 26 states require a woman seeking an abortion to wait a 
specified period of time, usually 24 hours, between when she receives counseling and the 
procedure is performed. 17 states use their own funds to pay for all or most medically needed 
abortions for Medicaid enrollees in the state. 32 states prohibit the use of state funds except in 
those cases when federal funds are available: where the woman’s life is in danger or the 
pregnancy is the result from rape or incest (Guttmacher Institute).
Literature Review
There are vast amounts of literature pertaining to abortion. Even with this being the case there 
are not many empirical studies on the effects of anti-abortion policies on abortion rates. The
imajority of studies done are with regard to parental involvement laws and restrictions of public 
funding. Medoff (2002) was interested in showing that a state's abortion policy is determined by 
the strength of interest advocacy groups and political forces. He also conducted empirical work 
estimating the impact that abortion restrictions have on a state’s abortion rate. Medoff concluded 
that the greater the membership in the National Abortion Rights Action League, percentage of 
female state legislators, and percentage of Democratic female legislators, the less restrictive a 
state’s abortion policy. Similarly, the greater the percentage of a state’s population is Roman 
Catholic the more restrictive a state’s abortion policy. His analysis of the demand for abortions 
found that his variable of interest, the state abortion restriction index, did not statistically differ 
from zero. He concluded that the extent of a state’s abortion restriction policy does not 
significantly affect a woman’s decision to have an abortion (Medoff, 2002).
Deborah Haas-Wilson (1996) published another similar empirical study that estimated the 
impact of enforced abortion restrictions on a minor’s demand for abortions between 1978 and 
1990. Her paper focuses on teenage abortion rates because the parental involvement laws only 
have a direct impact only on women less than 18 years of age. The results in her paper suggest 
that the two abortion restrictions, parental involvement and state restrictions on Medicaid 
funding, that were enforceable during the period 1978-90 decreased minors' demand for abortion 
services. Using four estimation strategies that correct for the problem of unmeasured state- 
specific variables, the parental involvement laws appear to decrease minors' demand for 
abortions by 13 to 25 percent, and state restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions appear to 
decrease minors' demand for abortions by 9 to 17 percent (Haas-Wilson, 1996).
A third published article from Journal o f Health Economics (1996) considered whether 
state Medicaid abortion funding restrictions affect the likelihood of getting pregnant, having an
4abortion, and bearing a child. The paper concluded that, after an analysis of 12 years of state- 
level data, the abortion restriction of Medicaid funding is associated with a reduction in abortions 
and either no change or a small reduction in births, implying fewer pregnancies (Levine, Trainor, 
Zimmerman, 1996).
The general consensus among scholars and empirical studies is that the parental 
involvement restriction seems to only greatly affect teenage abortion rates and not the overall 
abortion rate, since abortions obtained by minors represented only 12 percent of total legal 
abortions in 1987 (Haas-Wilson, 1996). Previous research also indicates that a significant 
percentage of pregnant minors wish to have abortions without their parent’s knowledge 
(Henshaw and Kost 1992). Some studies find that minor abortion trends in states that enacted 
these laws are similar to minor abortion trends in other states (Joyce and Kaestner 1996). 
Similarly, other studies find evidence that in-state abortion declines are offset by out-of-state 
increases (Ellertson 1997).
Parental involvement laws increase the difficulty for minors to obtain an abortion and in 
some cases give the parents legal rights to prevent abortions from taking place. These parental 
involvement restrictions can decrease a state’s abortion rate in a few different ways. One would 
be that it gives the teenager an incentive to travel to another state with less restrictive laws, thus 
decreasing the state of resident’s abortion rate. If traveling to another state is unobtainable then 
the teen is forced to inform her parents of the pregnancy. Parents who disapprove may be able to 
persuade the teen against the abortion, thus again decreasing the state’s abortion rate.
States that enforce a mandatory delay after counseling, usually 24 hours, require women 
seeking an abortion to receive information about the procedure and wait until the next day to 
have the procedure done. This procedural information can include information about the fetal
4development, the risks and nature of the procedure, alternatives to abortion, including private and 
agency adoption methods (NARAL). Some state laws even require women to view colored 
photos of fetuses in different stages of development. The main focus for the delay is so the 
women have time to go home and really think about the procedure and the alternatives. The 
counseling and delay may increase the psychological costs of the abortion, particularly for 
women who have moral concerns about the procedure. Furthermore, the information on the 
alternatives and support systems may decrease the perceived costs of carrying out the pregnancy. 
This might affect the decisions of women who are seeking an abortion because of the financial 
strain .
Almost all states fund abortions through Medicaid when the pregnancy is a result from 
rape or incest. However, states differ as to whether Medicaid programs fund abortions that are 
done for various personal reasons. Public funding restrictions could cause significant reductions 
in the abortion rate since a disproportionately high number of abortions are performed on low- 
income women (Jones, Darroch, and Henshaw 2002). Public funding restrictions increase the 
costs for obtaining an abortion for low-income women. Research shows that abortions are 
classified as a normal good. When there is money to fund the abortion one is more likely to 
receive the procedure.
Data
The data on the timing of the enactment and enforcement of the parental involvement, mandatory 
delay, and public funding restrictions were provided by the NARAL foundation. NARAL is a 
pro-choice organization in the United States that engages in political action to oppose restrictions 
on abortion and expand access to abortion. The NARAL data are the best available data on the 
dates of actual enforcement of the restrictions and are based on NARAL's tracking of court
i a
decisions, attorney general opinions, and other published sources (Haas-Wilson, 1996). See 
Appendix A for a state by state description as to which states enforce which of the three 
restrictions (X denotes that the restriction is in place for that state).
The Guttmacher Institute is a non-profit organization whose mission is to ensure the 
highest standard of sexual and reproductive health for all people worldwide (Guttmacher 
Institute mission). The Allan Guttmacher Institute obtains abortion data by conducting periodic 
surveys of abortion clinics in all 50 states plus the District of Colombia. The state data collected 
from the Guttmacher Institute was on abortion rates, total number of abortions, teen abortion 
rates, teen pregnancy rates, and number of providers. The unemployment statistics was collected 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Per capita personal income data was collected from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Education enrollment rates were taken from the Statistical 
Abstracts on the United States Census Bureau’s historical statistics webpage. See table below 
for further definition of variables.
Two separate panel data sets were constructed, one focusing on teen abortion rates and 
the other on overall state abortion rates. The time interval for the first panel data is from 1988- 
2005. Due to inconsistent data across the states, I was only able to use 5 years from the interval.
I have a full data set for each variable for the years of 1988,1992,1996,2000, and 2005. The 
three restrictions variables are coded as 0 if there was no enforcement of the restriction and 1 if 
the restriction was legally enforceable. The time interval for the second data set is from 1973- 
2008. This data set is incomplete and has missing observations for different variables. The 
abortion rate, total number of abortions, and number of providers variables have missing values 
for the years of 1983, 1986,1989,1990, 1993,1994,1997,1998,2001,2003,2003, and 2005. 
This is one of the problems with the Guttmacher Institute data. Even thought they are consistent
*with their data, they don’t release data for every year. The CDC also reports on abortion 
statistics, but studies have shown that they greatly underestimate the number of abortions. The 
income variable is reported for every year and the unemployment variable is missing for the 
years 1973-1976 for each state. Even though there are many missing observations in the second 
data set, there is still plenty of data to conclude a more accurate result than the first data set. The 
first data set has a total o f250 observations, whereas the second data set has 950.
Variable definitions
Variables Definitions
TeenArate The number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-19 by state of residence
TeenPrate The number of pregnancies per 1,000 women aged 15-19 by state of residence
TotalA The total number of abortions by state of occurrence
Arate The number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44 by state of occurrence
Providers Number of abortion providers
Income Per capita personal income
Urate Unemployment rate
EDU Enrollment rate (Percent of persons 5-17 years old)
R1 Restrictions on young women’s access to abortion
R2 Biased counseling and mandatory delay
R3 Restrictions on low-income women’s access to abortion
Most states experienced increasing abortion rates from 1973 to somewhere in the mid to
late 80’s where it leveled off and then began to drop. There was no uniform distribution for
when each restriction took place. The majority of the restrictions began to take place in the late 
80’s and early 90’s. A few states enacted abortion restrictions right after the Roe v. Wade (1973) 
ruling. For example, in 1974 Utah implemented all three restrictions.
Regression Model
The empirical test for the effectiveness of anti-abortion legislation involves regression analysis 
of abortion rates from both data sets mentioned above for every state (models exclude District of 
Colombia). Regression analysis should suit well for this type of research because it allows one 
to examine the effects of various factors on the main concern of this research, the amount of 
abortions that takes place at the state level. All regressions were run using SAS.
The two dependent variables used in the regressions were teenage abortion rates and state 
abortion rates. It is important to look at the rate versus the total number of abortions in each state 
because the rate takes into consideration the population of women. This measure provides 
information about the proportion of women of childbearing age who obtains abortions. For each 
dependent variable I ran two separate regressions. One fixed effects model with 49 state dummy 
variables and one without the dummy variables. The fixed effects model is used to represent the 
observed quantities in terms of explanatory variables that are treated as if the quantities were not 
random. If we assume fixed effects, we then impose time independent effects for each entity that 
are possibly correlated with the regressors.
For the regression with teenage abortion rates as my dependent I used the three 
restrictions (parental involvement, mandatory waiting period, and public funding) as separate 
variables plus four control variables as my independent variables. These control variables 
included teenage pregnancy rate, number of providers, unemployment rate, and per capita 
personal income. The data set from 1988-2005 was used for the first regression. The fixed
effect model had the same variables as the one without the dummies except it had New_l- 
New_49 variables added, which were the state dummy variables. These dummy variables take 
on the values 0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of some categorical effect that may be 
expected to shift the outcome (Draper, 1998).
Two similar regressions were run using the larger data set form 1973-2008 with state 
abortion rates as my dependent variable. The independent variables were R l, R2, R3, per capita 
personal income, unemployment rate, and number of providers.
Regression Results
The results from the two models varied. Adding the 49 dummy variables to each model changed 
the parameter estimates and statistical significances greatly. The first model (teenage abortion 
rates as dependent) without the 49 dummy variables had all statistically significant variables for 
my three restriction variables. They all had a negative effect on teenage abortion rates. This 
implies that all three restrictions, when enacted, have a negative effect on teenage abortion rates. 
The other control variables also were significant and not surprising. As teenage pregnancy rates 
went up so did teenage abortion rates. The same goes the number or abortion providers. When 
the state dummy variables were added into the model I lost significance to a lot of my variables. 
The good news is that the restriction that stayed significant was the parental involvement 
restriction. The parameter estimate was -1.72999 and significant at alpha=.05. The 
interpretation of this would be there is a decrease in the teenage abortion rate by 1.72999 when 
this restriction is enforced. This may not seem like a lot but remember that the average teenage 
abortion rate is around 25 abortions (see summary statistics) per 1,000 women aged 15-19. The 
incidence of parental involvement decreases the abortion rate by about seven percent. This is 
good news because it is in line with other studies that determined that this restriction does have a
significant effect on teenage abortion rates. The regression results do not imply that the other 
restrictions have no affect teenage abortion rates.
Similar results were found for my other data set with state abortion rates as my dependent 
variable. All restriction variables had a negative effect on abortion with statistical significance in 
the unrestricted model. When dummy variables were added I lost significance for my variables 
except for the mandatory delay after counseling variable. The parameter estimate for this 
variable was -0.79913 (significant at alpha=.10). The average abortion rate is about 20 
(summary statistics); this implies that this restriction would decrease the abortion rate by about 
four percent. Full SAS regression output can be found in the Appendix section.
Summary Statistics for TeenArate Regression
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Year 250 1996.20 5.9584 1988.00 2005.00
TeenArate 250 25.0960 13.6866 6.00 76.00
TeenPrate 250 85.8120 24.0357 33.00 157.00
TeenBrate 250 48.5160 13.9908 18.00 84.00
Providers 250 42.1320 78.8829 1.00 608.00
Income 250 24533.65 7347.29 11566.00 48134.00
Urate 250 5.2704 1.7016 2.3000 11.3000
EDU 250 91.0816 3.8468 80.3000 101.3000
R1 250 0.5800 0.4931 0 1.00
R2 250 0.2800 0.4499 0 1.00
R3 250 0.3680 0.4832 0 1.00
4Summary Statistics for Arate Regression
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Year 1800 1990.00 10.3912 1973.00 2008.00
Total A 1200 26506.88 43805.30 0 320960.00
Arate 1200 19.0506 9.7930 0 54.50
R1 1800 0.4533 0.4970 0 1.00
R2 1800 0.2222 0.4159 0 1.00
R3 1800 0.2861 0.4521 0 1.00
Providers 1100 46.9191 82.3890 0 608.00
Income 1800 19607.88 10501.25 3597.00 56959.00
Urate 1650 5.8157 2.0549 2.10 17.90
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the errors varies across observations. If 
the errors are heteroscedastic, the OLS estimator remains unbiased, but becomes inefficient 
(Laurie, long, 1998). Note that the heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and p-values are 
calculated in the SAS output and did not change the results.
Discussion
The regression results provide some solid evidence that certain types of state-level anti-abortion 
legislation can reduce in-state abortion rates. The findings for parental involvement restrictions 
for teenage abortion rates are the most consistent. It makes sense that the parental involvement 
restriction is only statistically significant for teenage abortion rates and not state abortion rates. 
For some reason I did not get the results for the public funding restriction that I anticipated. This
9restriction should have a significant effect on both teenage abortion rates and state abortion rates. 
I got the correct negative parameter sign with the fixed effects model for state abortion rates as 
my dependent, but it wasn’t significant. For some unexplainable reason I got a significant 
positive parameter estimate for the fixed effects model for teenage abortion rates as my 
dependent. This is not a perfect model and is only an estimation of the effects of abortion 
restrictions on abortion rates. There are many other factors that may contribute to overall 
declines in abortion rates. For example, sex education in schools has been something that 
schools are taking more and more seriously as of late. Also, birth control and abstinence are two 
very effective means to keep pregnancy and abortion rates down.
Some limitations to the model are that the model cannot capture all the exogenous effects 
of some of the economic factors mentioned above. Immigration, ethnicity, and religious 
preference are all things that should be considered when thinking about abortion rates. Abortion 
rates differ among different ethnicities and the Hispanic population tends to have lower abortion 
rates. This could be a cause of the high Catholic percentage of Hispanics. The southern states 
that have a high Hispanic population could be experiencing the effects of immigration on 
abortion rates. Political factors also can affect the abortion rates. States that tend to be 
Republican have a higher Roman Catholic percentage and push for more strict laws on abortion, 
where Democratic states tend to be more Pro Choice.
Conclusion
The number of abortions that were performed in the United States consistently increased 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (Brener, 2002). However, between 1990 and 2005, the 
number of legal abortions declined by 22.22 percent (CDC). A number of different reasons for 
this decline are possible. One factor that played a role was the increased amount of anti-abortion
legislation that was passed at the state level. Although this study is unable to provide a clear 
rationale of why state level abortion rates have decreased with respect to anti-abortion 
legislation, it does show parental involvement, mandatory waiting periods, and public funding 
restrictions can influence one’s decision to have an abortion.
Through regression analysis it can be shown that the most consistent restriction that plays 
a major role on teenage abortion rates is the parental involvement laws. The analysis is not 
concluding that the other restrictions are ineffective; they just don’t have as large of an impact. 
State abortion rates are not significantly affected by the parental involvement laws, but are 
negatively correlated to mandatory delay restrictions. My analysis is not consistent with other 
studies with respect to public funding restrictions. This restriction should have a more 
significant affect on both teenage abortion rates and total state abortion rates.
It will be concluded that public funding restrictions, parental involvement laws, and 
mandatory delays would, respectively, increase the costs of obtaining an abortion, place legal 
constraints on minor’s ability to obtain an abortion, and require that women are informed about 
the procedure and have time to think about it. Further research needs to be conducted to better 
understand the effects that anti-abortion restrictions have on abortion rates.
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S ta te R1 R2 R3
AL X X X
AK X
AZ X X






GA X X X
HI
ID X X X
IL
IN X X X
IA X X
KS X X X
KY X X X




MI X X X
MN X X
MS X X X




MO X X X
MT






NC X X X
ND X X X
OH X X X
OK X X X
OR
PA X X X
RI X X
SC X X X
SD X X X
TN X X
TX X X X
UT X X X
VT
VA X X X
WA
WV X X
WI X X X
WY X X
Note: X denotes that the restriction is in place for that state as of April 1,2012
Appendix B
The SA S System
The REG Procedure 
Model: M OD EL 1 
Dependent Variable: TeenArate
N u m be r of O bse rva tions Read 250
N um be r of O bse rva tions Used 250
A n a lysis  of Variance




F  Value P r >  F
M odel 7 32637 4662.41154 80.55 <.0001
E rro r 242 14007 57.87940
Corrected Tota l 249 46644
R oot M S E 7.60785 R -Square 0.6997
D ependent Mean 25.09600 A d j R -S q 0.6910
C o e ffV a r 30.31500
Param eter Estim ates








t  Value P r>|t|
Intercept 1 5.71214 4.38265 1.30 0.1937 3.64720 1.57 0.1186
TeenP rate 1 0.32322 0.02864 11.29 <.0001 0.03152 10.26 <.0001
Providers 1 0.04519 0.00712 6.35 <.0001 0.00937 4.82 <.0001
Urate 1 -1.33176 0.32536 -4.09 <.0001 0.37634 -3.54 0.0005
Incom e 1 0.00005208 0.00008244 0.63 0.5282 0.00006720 0.77 0.4391
R1 1 -3.68692 1.17439 -3.14 0.0019 1.27218 -2.90 0.0041
R2 1 -4.00925 1.32701 -3.02 0.0028 1.03745 -3.86 0.0001
R3 1 -3.32684 1.21696 -2.73 0.0067 1.14525 -2.90 0.0040
Appendix C
The SAS System
The R EG  Procedure 
Model: M OD EL 2 (fixed effects) 
Dependent Variable: TeenArate
N um be r o f O b se rva tions Read 250
N um be r o f O bse rva tions Used 250
A n a lysis  of Variance




F  Value P r >  F
M odel 56 44838 800.68368 85.59 <.0001
E rro r 193 1805.41018 9.35446
Corrected Tota l 249 46644
R oot M S E 3.05851 R -Squ a re 0.9613
D ependent Mean 25.09600 A dj R -S q 0.9501
Coeff V a r 12.18722
Param eter Estim ates




t Value P r >|t| Heteroscedasticity C onsistent
Standard
E rro r
t  Value J Pi* > |t|
Intercept | 1 -3.43964 4.54841 -0.76 0.4504 4.72445 -0.73 | 0.4675
Te e n  Prate | 1 0.41985 0.03305 12.70 <.0001 0.03803 11.04 | <.0001
Providers j 1 0.05980 0.01816 3.29 0.0012 0.01955 3.06 | 0.0025
Urate | 1 -0.62607 0.16693 -3.75 0.0002 0.15081 -4.15 <.0001
Incom e | 1 -0.00023891 0.00007609 -3.14 0.0020 0.00007534 -3.17 | 0.0018
R1 | 1 -1.72999 0.83232 -2.08 0.0390 0.77349 -2.24 0.0265
R2 | 1 0.80981 0.84441 0.96 0.3387 0.70979 1.14 | 0.2553
R3 | 1 1.61820 0.80947 2.00 0.0470 0.68766 2.35 | 0.0196
Appendix D
The SAS System
The R EG  Procedure 
Model: M OD EL 1 
Dependent Variable: Arate
N um be r o f O bse rva tions Read 1800 |
N um be r o f O bservations U sed 950
N um be r of O bse rva tions w ith  M issing Values 850
A n a lysis  of Variance




F  Value P r > F
M odel 6 41480 6913.34026 141.54 <.0001
E rro r 943 46060 48.84458
Corrected To ta l 949 87540
R oot M S E 6.98889 R -Squ a re 0.4738
Dependent Mean 20.32632 A d j R -S q 0.4705
C o e ffV a r 34.38346
Param eter Estim ates




t  Value P r >  |t| Heteroscedasticity C onsistent
Standard
E rro r
t Value P r > |t|
Intercept 1 20.42294 1.07889 18.93 <.0001 1.09855 18.59 <.0001
Providers 1 0.05648 0.00286 19.77 <.0001 0.00397 14.22 <.0001
Incom e 1 0.00003248 0.00002731 1.19 0.2346 0.00002622 1.24 0.2158
Urate 1 -0.10438 0.12776 -0.82 0.4141 0.12608 -0.83 0.4079
R1 1 -2.38588 0.57555 -4.15 <.0001 0.56276 -4.24 <.0001
R2 1 -4.99586 0.71024 -7.03 <.0001 0.59800 -8.35 <.0001
R3 1 -3.35437 0.66023 -5.08 <.0001 0.55125 -6.09 <.0001
Appendix E
The SAS System
The R EG Procedure 
Model: M ODEL 2 (fixed effects) 
Dependent Variable: Arate
N um be r o f O bservations Read 1800
N um be r o f O bse rva tions Used 950
N u m be r o f O bse rva tions w ith M issing Values 850
A n a lysis  o f Variance




F Value P r >  F
M odel 55 77835 1415.18878 130.36 <.0001
E rro r 894 9705.09938 10.85582
C orrected Tota l 949 87540
R oot M S E 3.29482 R -Square 0.8891
Dependent Mean 20.32632 A d j R -S q 0.8823
C o e ffV a r 16.20961
Param eter Estim ates




t  Value P r > |t| Heteroscedasticity C onsistent
Standard
E rro r
t  Value P r > |t|
Intercept 1 9.04315 0.94717 9.55 <.0001 0.68749 13.15 <.0001
Providers 1 0.09934 0.00898 11.06 <.0001 0.01039 9.56 <.0001
Incom e 1 -0.00018830 0.00001781 -10.57 <.0001 0.00001903 -9.90 <.0001
Urate 1 -0.14426 0.07604 -1.90 0.0581 0.07313 -1.97 0.0489
R1 1 0.55199 0.39244 1.41 0.1599 0.35187 1.57 0.1171
R2 1 -0.79913 0.48260 -1.66 0.0981 0.36444 -2.19 0.0286
R3 1 -0.01121 0.43680 -0.03 0.9795 0.38618 -0.03 0.9768
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